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Abstract. This paper presents a stochastic multi-agent model of stock
market. The market dynamics include switches between chartists and
fundamentalists and switches in the prevailing opinions (optimistic or
pessimistic) among chartists. A nonlinear dynamical system is derived to
depict the underlying mechanisms of market evolvement. Under different
settings of parameters representing traders’ mimetic contagion propen-
sity, price chasing propensity and strategy switching propensity, the sys-
tem exhibits four kinds of dynamic regimes: fundamental equilibrium,
non-fundamental equilibrium, periodicity and chaos.
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1 Introduction
Stock market exhibits a variety of dynamic regimes. According to efficient mar-
ket hypothesis and rational expectation theory, market price always fluctuates
around the fundamental values [1]. While in real market the price may deviate
from fundamental value persistently, and plenty of empirical work gives the ev-
idence for rational speculative bubbles [2–4]. Market can also be in a periodic
regime commonly described as bull and bear cycle [5–7]. And researchers even
investigated the chaotic behaviors in stock market [8].
Therefor, modeling the dynamics of financial market has attracted much
interest of researchers in recent years. Different models have been presented
to describe the market dynamic regimes including equilibrium, periodicity and
chaos [9–14] .
But less attention has been paid to the influence of traders’ behaviors to mar-
ket dynamic regimes. In fact traders’ behavior play a important role in financial
market, many traders regard stock market full of speculative opportunities, they
use technical strategy to forecast future price, and traders’ emotional factors
may drive market into bubbles and crashes [15]. There is even a new subject
called behavioral finance which studies how behavioral factors affect finance
market [16].
Inspired by statistical physics, Lux and Marchesi presented a model with
switching mechanism where fundamentalists and chartists may compare their
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performance and switch to each other [17,18]. This model is built from the bot-
tom to up: first considering the basic behavioral pattern to model the switch
possibility of traders among different groups, then deriving a dynamical system
to approximate the market evolution. Hence the dynamical system reserves the
traders’ main behavioral propensities. Following the line of Lux, we present a
stock market model with four kinds of dynamic regimes: fundamental equilib-
rium, non-fundamental equilibrium, periodicity and chaos, and concentrate on
analyzing the effect of traders behavioral propensities such as mimetic propen-
sity, price-chasing propensity and strategy-switching propensity on the market
dynamic regimes.
2 The model
In this model, N traders deal in a single financial asset with fixed fundamental
value pf . Three groups of agents are considered. First, N traders are split up into
the groups of chartists and fundamentalists with nc(t) and nf (t) denoting the
(time-varying) numbers of agents in both groups (nc+nf = N). Fundamentalists
expect the price to follow the fundamental value of the asset and buy (sell) when
the actual market price is believed to be below (above) the fundamental value.
While chartists attempt to identify price trends and patterns, and consider the
behavior of other traders as a source of information, which results in a tendency
towards herding behavior. Second, the chartists group consists of optimistic and
pessimistic individuals whose numbers are given by n+(t) and n−(t) with n+(t)+
n−(t) = nc. The optimists will buy additional units of the asset, whereas the
pessimists will sell part of their actual holdings of the asset. The major building
blocks of the model are transitions of agents from one group to another together
with endogenous price changes resulting from the agentsoperations.
2.1 Market components
First, the probabilities of switches of agents from the pessimistic to the optimistic
subgroup and vice versa are denoted by pi+−∆t and pi−+∆t during a small time
increment ∆t, where pi+− and pi−+ are concretized as follows:
pi+− = v1 exp(U1), pi−+ = v1 exp(−U1) (1)
with U1 = α1x + α2p˙/v1, x = (n+ − n−)/nc. Here, the basic influences on the
chartists’ formation of opinion are the majority opinion of their fellow traders x
and the actual price trend, (dp/dt)/v1. Parameter v1 is the frequency of reval-
uation of opinion, α1,and α2 are the measure of the importance of majority
opinion and price trend in chartists’ behavior respectively, we call them mimetic
propensity and price-chasing propensity.
Chartists and fundamentalists are assumed to meet each other at random
and possibly change their strategy by comparing the performance. Switching
from the chartist to the fundamentalist group and vice versa are formalized
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in a similar manner. The notational convention in the transition probabilities
below is also that the first index denotes the subgroup to which a trader moves
and the second index gives the subgroup to which he formerly belonged (hence,
as an example, pi+f∆t is the probability for a fundamentalist to switch to the
optimistic chartists’ group):
pi+f = v2 exp(U2,1), pif+ = v2 exp(−U2,1)
pi−f = v2 exp(U2,2), pif− = v2 exp(−U2,2) (2)
with
U2,1 = α3[(r + p˙/v2)/p−R− s|(pf − p)/p|]
U2,2 = α3[R− (r + p˙/v2)/p− s|(pf − p)/p|]
The forcing terms U2,1 and U2,2 for these transitions depend on the differ-
ence between the profits earned by chartists and fundamentalists. Here v2 is the
frequency with which agents reconsider their trading strategies, and α3 is the
sensitivity of agents to profit differentials, called strategy-switching propensity.
Profits enjoyed by chartists from the optimistic group are composed of nominal
dividends r and capital gains due to the price change dp/dt. Dividing by the
actual market price gives the revenue per unit of the asset. Excess returns are
computed by subtracting the average real risk-adjusted return R available from
other investments. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, consider the deviation
between price and fundamental value pf (irrespective of its sign) as the source
of arbitrage opportunities. As the gains from arbitrage occur only in the future
it is discounted by a factor s < 1. Furthermore, neglecting the dividend term in
fundamentalists’ profits is justified by assuming that they correctly perceive the
(long-term) real returns as equally as the average return of alternative invest-
ments, i.e. R = r/pf .
Entry and exit are incorporated by assuming that a constant portion (a) of
traders is regularly replaced by new entrants. It is natural for this assumption
because there always be some investors who need cash for emergent use, and
some others who have free money to invest. Both fundamentalists and chartists
are equally likely to exit, the newcomers act as chartists and fundamentalists
in a fixed proportion, saying b(b ∈ [0, 1]) of newcomers as fundamentalists and
1 − b as chartists. Newcomers of chartists follow the prevailing market opin-
ion(optimistic or pessimistic), that is the distribution of market opinion in new
chartists is the same as current market. Exit and entry mechanism can also
be described as probability transition. For example, among nf fundamental-
ists, we have anf of them exit and (1 − a)nf stay. Corresponding to those ex-
ited, abnf fundamentalists and a(1− b)nf chartists including a(1− b)nf (n+/nc)
and a(1 − b)nf (n−/nc) enter. For (1 − a)nf fundamentalists left, according to
above transition probabilities, (1 − a)nfpi+f (n+/N) of them switch to opti-
mistic chartists and (1−a)nfpi−f (n−/N) switch to pessimistic chartists, leaving
(1−a)nf [1−pi+f (n+/N)−pi−f (n−/N)] keep as fundamentalists. The transitions
of pessimistic and optimistic chartists are similarly available. Figure 1 illustrates
the transitions among the three groups.
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Fig. 1. Transitions among three groups
Lastly, the dynamics of the asset’s price results from the market operations
of our agents and the ensuing price adjustment by a market maker who reacts
sluggishly on excess demand. Assuming a constant average trading volume per
transaction Tc, excess demand of chartists is EDc = (n+−n−)Tc. Excess demand
of fundamentalists EDf = nfγ(pf − p)/p with γ being a parameter for the
strength of reaction on price deviation. So, dp/dt = β(EDc + EDf ) , where β
denotes the price adjustment strength.
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2.2 Market dynamics
In this part,we derive a three dimensional differential equations system to ap-
proximate the dynamics of the model above. The three variables used to de-
scribe the market states are x = (n+ − n−)/nc (named market confidence
index),y = nf/N(named market rationality index) and price p. According to
the transition mechanism defined above(see figure 1), the change of optimistic
chartists number n+at a time point is given as:
dn+/dt =a(1− b)n+
nc
nf + (1− a)n+
N
pi+fnf + a(1− b)n+
nc
n− + (1− a)nc
N
pi+−n−
− abn+ − a(1− b)n−
nc
n+ − (1− a)nf
N
pif+n+ − (1− a)nc
N
pi−+n+
(3)
Rearrange equation (3):
dn+/dt =(1− a)[(n−pi+− − n+pi−+) + (nfpi+f − n+pif+)]
+ a(1− a)nf n+
nc
− abn+ (4)
Similarly, the change of number of pessimistic chartists is:
dn−/dt =(1− a)[(n+pi−+ − n−pi+−) + (nfpi−f − n−pif−)]
+ a(1− a)nf n−
nc
− abn− (5)
From nc = n+ + n−, one arrives at dnc/dt = d(n+ + n−)/dt = dn+/dt +
dn−/dt. So the time evolution of nc is:
dnc/dt = (1− a)[nfpi+f − n+pif+ + nfpi−f ]− a(1− b) (6)
As defined, market confidence index x = (n+ − n−)/nc,market rationality
index y = nf/N . Note that nc = n+ + n−,nc + nf = N . It then follows that
nf = yN , n+ = (1+x)(1−y)N , and n− = (1−x)(1−y)N . Following derivative
rules, one can get:
dx/dt =(1− a)(1− y)[(1− x)pi+− − (1 + x)pi−+]
+
1
2
y(1− x2)(pi+f − pif+ + pif− − pi−f )
(7)
One may note that the terms from ’entry-exit’ mechanism cancel out, which
means that they do not influence the distribution of the opinion among chartists.
This makes sense for our assumption that the newcomers of chartists follow the
prevailing market opinion.
The evolution of y can also be derived as:
dy/dt =
1
2
(1− a)y(1− y)(1 + x)(pi+f − pif+)
+
1
2
(1− a)y(1− y)(1− x)(pi−f − pif−) + a(1− b)y
(8)
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We can also notice that (N) disappears in dx/dt and dy/dt. This means that
it is not the number of traders but the distribution among different groups that
determines the market dynamics.
According to mode setting above, the change price dp/dt = β(EDc + EDf )
can be formulated as a function of our market state variables x,y and p.
dp/dt = β[β[x(1− y)Tc + y(pf − p)Tf ]] (9)
Inserting the transition possibility (1) and (2) into time development of mar-
ket confidence index (7), market rationality index(8) and price (9), we get:
x˙ =2v1(1− a)(1− y)[tanh(U1)− x] cosh(U1)
+ v2(1− a)(1− x2)[sinh(U2,1)− sinh(U2,2)]
y˙ =− v2(1− a)y(1− y)[(1 + x) sinh(U2,1)
+ (1− x) sinh(U2,2)]− a(1− b)y + ab(1− y)
p˙ = β[x(1− y)Tc + y(pf − p)Tf ]
(10)
where
U1 = α1x+ α2p˙/v1
U2,1 = α3[(r + p˙/v2)/p−R− s|(pf − p)/p|]
U2,2 = α3[R− (r + p˙/v2)/p− s|(pf − p)/p|]
This system governs the evolution of the multi-agent stock market model.
Using certain approximation schemes [19], it can be shown to coincide with a
first-order approximation to the exact dynamics of mean values of the underling
stochastic model. When a = 0 (no ’entry-exit’ mechanism), system (10) equals
Lux model in [17]. This means that our modified model generalizes it and makes
it a special case.
3 Market dynamic regimes
In this part, we analyze system (10) with both analytical and numerical approach
to find different dynamic regimes. At the same time, we mainly concentrate on
understanding how traders behavioral propensities such as mimetic contagion
propensity (α1), price-chasing propensity (α2) and strategy switching propensity
(α3) influence the market dynamic regimes.
3.1 Fundamental equilibrium and stability
Fundamental equilibrium with market price equaling underlying asset value ex-
ists in this model. Proposition 1 gives the existence of such an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. For all parameter values,(x∗ = 0, y∗ = b, p∗ = pf ) is an equi-
librium of system (10).
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Proof. With x∗ = 0, p∗ = pf , one gets dp/dt = 0.
Then inserting dp/dt = 0, x∗ = 0 to RHS of U1 equation, U1 = 0. Because
p∗ = pf , r = Rpf , x∗ = 0, U2,1 = U2,2 = 0. Then we can see that dx/dt = 0.
With y∗ = b, the last two terms of doty equation cancel out. With U2,1 =
U2,2 = 0, one gets dy/dt = 0. uunionsq
Under fundamental equilibrium, the market price equals the underlying
value of assets, so there no price-chasing opportunities. The forces of optimistic
chartists and pessimistic chartists are in balance, and mimetic effect cancels out.
The market rationality index y = nf/N equals the constant b, which is the por-
tion of fundamentalists in all the newcomers in the ’entry-exit’ mechanism. This
means that in such case the ’entry-exit’ mechanism has no influence to market
dynamics.
Proposition 2 provides the stability conditions of fundamental equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions
(i)v1α1 + (1− b)βTcα2 + bβTc
pf
α3 < v1 +
βbTf
2(1− a)(1− b)
(ii)v1pfTfα1 − v2TcRα3 − v1pfTf < 0
(11)
(x∗ = 0, y∗ = b, p∗ = pf ) is a stable equilibrium of system (10).
Proof. The entries of the three-by-three Jacobian A of system (10), evaluated at
the equilibrium (x∗ = 0, y∗ = b, p∗ = pf ) are:
a11 =
∂x˙
∂x
= 2(1− a)(1− b)[v1α1 + α2βTc(1− b)− v1) + α3βbTc/pf ],
a12 =
∂x˙
∂y
= 0, a13 =
∂x˙
∂p
= −2(1− a)[(1− b)βTfα2 + v2r(pf )2 +
βbTf
pf
,
a21 =
∂y˙
∂x
= 0, a22 =
∂y˙
∂y
= −a,
a23 =
∂y˙
∂p
=
{−2v2α3s(1− a)b(1− b)/pf p < pf
2v2α3s(1− a)b(1− b)/pf p < pf ,
a31 =
∂p˙
∂x
= β(1− b)Tc, a32 = ∂p˙
∂y
= 0, a33 =
∂p˙
∂p
= −βbTf
The discontinuity in the entry a23 stems from the absolute term in the profit
differential. In the case of continuous derivatives, stability hinges on the signs of
the roots of the matrix A. Considering separately the cases p < pf and p > pf ,
one finds that in both cases the roots λi(i = 1, 2, 3) are determined by the same
characteristic equation: (a22 − λ)[(a11 − λ)(a33 − λ)− a13a31] = 0.
Obviously, λ1 = a22 = −a < 0 is a eigenvalue of A. If the other two eigen-
values are less than 0, (x∗ = 0, y∗ = b, p∗ = pf ) is a stable equilibrium. This
requires the quadratic equation of λ, λ2 − (a11 + a22)λ + a11a33 − a13a31 = 0
has two negative roots. By Vieta’s Theorem, one arrives at a11 + a33 < 0 and
a11a33 − a13a31 > 0. Rearranging these two inequalities gives the sufficient con-
ditions as (11) of local stability of fixed point (x∗ = 0, y∗ = b, p∗ = pf ). uunionsq
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A close look at these conditions gives some insights. Because we focus on
analysis of the influence of traders propensities to market dynamics, we keep
other parameters fixed, following Lux’s setting v1 = 0.5, v2 = 0.75, a = 0.01, b =
0.05, β = 0.5, R = 0.1, Tc = Tf = 5, pf = 10, r = R/pf = 0.01. All the analysis
and experiments in this paper are based on this setting. Condition (i) requires
that a linear combination of α1, α2, α3 must less than a positive value, this im-
plies that the larger those traders behavioral propensities are, the more possible
the condition (i) is violated. Investigating the coefficients of them gives that α2 is
more easier to violate the condition because it multiples with Tc which is usually
relatively large. Rearranging condition (ii), one can get α1 < v2TcRv1pfTf α3+1. This
implies that there is a interdependence between mimetic contagion propensity
α1 and strategy switching propensity α3. An upper value for the parameter α1
associated with α3, saying α¯1, exists beyond which the fundamental equilibrium
will lose stability.
3.2 Non-fundamental equilibria
Non-fundamental equilibria is referred as that the market price deviates from
fundamental value persistently. Proposition 3 provides the possible existence of
such equilibria.
Proposition 3. (i) For α1 ≤ 1, no equilibria other than the fundamental equi-
librium exist in system (10). (ii) For α1 > 1, there may exist additional equilibria
E+(x+ > 0, p+ > pf , y+ > b) and E−(x− < 0, p− < pf , y− > b)
Proof. From dp/dt = 0 it can be seen that possible equilibria x+ > 0(x− < 0)
are connected with price p+ > pf (p− < pf ). Then U2,1 < 0, U2,2 > U2,1 when
x+ > 0, p+ > pf and U2,2 < 0, U2,1 > U2,2 when x− < 0, p− < pf . This implies
that the second term in the RHS of dx/dt equation is negative for any pair
(x+, p+) and positive for any (x−, p−). Hence in order to obtain stability, the
first term has to carry the opposite sign. Since cosh(U1) is always positive, the
sign of the first term hinges on the expression tanh(U1)− x. Because dp/dt = 0
in equilibrium, this expression is reduced to tanh(α1x)− x.
For α1 < 1, tanh(α1s) − x < 0 for x > 0 and tanh(α1x) − x > 0 for x < 0.
So, dx/dt < 0 for (x+, p+) and dx/dt > 0 for (x−, p−). There is no other stable
equilibria other than fundamental equilibrium.
For α1 > 1, the equation tanh(α1x) − x = 0 has three solutions (−x¯, 0, x¯)
and
tanh(α1)− x

> 0 for x < −x¯
< 0 for − x¯ < x < 0
> 0 for 0 < x < x¯
< 0 for x > x¯
(12)
Therefore, for −x¯ < x < 0 and 0 < x < x¯, the first and second term in dx/dt
carry opposite signs and there could indeed exist additional equilibria E+(x+ >
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0, p+ > pf ) and E−(x− < 0, p− < pf ) where x− = −x+, p+ − ff = pf − p− and
−x¯ < x− < 0 and 0 < x+ < x¯.
For any pair (x+, p+) and (x−, p−), the first term of dy/dt equation is pos-
itive. Then dy/dt = 0 implies ab(1 − y) − a(1 − b)y < 0, we can get y > b.
uunionsq
In such equilibria, since price p is constant, there is no price-chasing incentive.
But the market confidence index x 6= 0, there is a force of mimetic to make price
far away from fundamental value. It is balanced by the force of fundamentalists
who buy (or sell) when price is lower (or higher) than fundamental value which
can be inferred from y > b.
Proposition 4 presents the symmetry of the possible non-fundamental equi-
libria.
Proposition 4. Let E1(x1, y1, p1) be an equilibrium of system (10), then there
exists a point E2(x2 = −x1, y2 = y1, p2 = 2pf − p1) is also an equilibrium.
Proof. WithE1(x1, y1, p1) be an equilibrium of system (10),dxdt |x1,y1,p1 = 0,dydt |x1,y1,p1 =
0,dpdt |x1,y1,p1 = 0.
From x2 = −x1, y2 = y1, p2 = 2pf − p1, one gets U1(x2, y2, p2) = −α1x1 =
−U1, U2,1(x2, y2, p2) = U2,2(x2, y2, p2) = −sα3| p1−pf2pf−p1 |.
So, dxdt |x2,y2,p2 = 2v1(1−a)(1−y1)[− tanh(U1)+x1] cosh(U1) = −dxdt |x1,y1,p1 =
0, dydt |x2,y2,p2 = −v2(1 − a)y1(1 − y1)[sinh(U2,1) + sinh(U2,2)] − a(1 − b)y1 +
ab(1 − y1) = dydt |x1,y1,p1 = 0, dpdt |x2,y2,p2 = −β[x1(1 − y1)Tc + y1(pf − f1)Tf ] =
−dpdt |x1,y1,p1 = 0. uunionsq
This proposition ensures that if the non-fundamental equilibria exist they
must appear in pair and be symmetric to each other by x = 0, p = pf . Nu-
merical experiments using 4-order Runge-Kutta approach to integrate this or-
dinary differential equations system confirm these results. In most settings of
parameters with α1 > 1, non-fundamental equilibria occur. For example, when
α1 = 1.5,α2 = 0.25,α3 = 1.5, we get two stable non-fundamental equilibria at
(x∗ = 0.85, y∗ = 0.78, p∗ = 10.23) and(x∗ = −0.85, y∗ = 0.78, p∗ = 9.77). We
should notice that it does not mean that stable non-fundamental equilibria exist
for all α1 > 1, and we will come across exceptions near α1 = 1 in the following
part.
3.3 Periodicity and chaos regimes
Because of the highly non-linearity of the system, we rely heavily on numerical
experiments to investigate the its dynamics. By plenty of Runge-Kutta integra-
tion we find that between the ranges of parameters of fundamental equilibrium
and non-fundamental equilibria, some complex behaviors such as periodicity and
chaos appear. Figure 2 is some numerical experiment results of system (10) with
α1 = 0.95, α2 = 0.2, α3 = 0.5 where the market is in a periodicity regimes.
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Fig. 2. Numerical experiments of cycle regime
From the stable periodic orbit in the left part of figure 2 we can notice the bull
and bear cycle in market evolvement. Such a regime enables us to investigate the
check and balance of different forces thoroughly. The right part of figure 2 shows
the typical trajectories of x, y, p over a time span after the transitional stage,
x, y, p are rescaled as x′ = x−x¯σx (black), y
′ = y−y¯σy (blue), p
′ = p−p¯σp (red) for visual
convenience. In the bull stage, price p is increasing, so the optimistic chartists
who buy stocks can earn more, and attract fundamentalists and pessimistic
chartists to switch to optimistic chartists, hence x becomes larger and y smaller.
Meanwhile, those transitions strengthen the call-side force and make the price
p climbe higher. But when there is too much optimistic chartists in market, the
number of agents switching to optimistic chartists decreases, that is dx/dt < 0.
At the same time, the deviation of price to fundamental value provides incentives
for fundamentalists to arbitrage, so the rationality index y start to fall down first.
And the increase of put-side force makes the up-climbing of price become slower
and turn down at last. Then the market enters the bear stage.
Figure 3 gives the numerical experiment results of system (10) with α1 =
1.008, α2 = 0.2, α3 = 0.5 where the market is in a chaos regimes. The left part is
the strange attractor in phase portrait. Investigate the time series of x, y, p (the
right part of figure 3, rescaled as above) there are similar patterns to periodic
regime, but balance is broken and these patterns cannot persist for a long time.
we can realize that the underlying forces driving the market dynamics is the
same, but because all the equilibria and periodic orbit lose stability and the
evolution of market exhibits a deterministic randomness.
3.4 Overall view of regimes with a bifurcation diagram
In this part, we present a overall view of four different dynamic regimes with
a bifurcation diagram, as in figure 4. We use α1 as the control parameter with
α2 = 0.2 and α3 = 0.5. For each value of α1 from 0 to 2, we integrate system
(10) by 4-order Runge-Kutta method with a random initial value in a feasible
range, say x ∈ [−1, 1], y ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ [5, 15]. The objective of choosing random
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Fig. 3. Numerical experiments of chaos regime
initial value is to find the possibility of coexisting attractors such as coexisting
non-fundamental equilibria after α1 = 1, although for a certain α1, we integrate
once and get one attractor, but by randomness of initial value, the result with α1
nearby may come to the other different attractors. After we get the price series
by integration, we generalize the idea of first return map introduced in [20] to
draw this diagram. The first-return is the successive maximum of the time series
for a single variable. Here we find both the local maxima and local minima of
price p. Because we have to cope with all kinds of regimes, we first judge the
solution type, if it is a stable equilibrium, we draw p of this equilibrium versus
α1 with red color, otherwise, we plot all local maxima and minima of p with blue
color.
One may notice that when α1 is less than 0.2 approximatively, the conditions
in (11) are satisfied, and system (10) is in a fundamental regime(red color). As
α1 increases, the conditions in (11) are violated, so the fundamental equilibrium
loses stability, and a hopf bifurcation occurs with stock market falling into a
periodic regime. In the periodic regime, the maximum p is larger than pf and
minimum p less than fundamental value pf , and the maximum distance from
fundamental value gets larger with α1 increasing(blue color). When α1 is beyond
1, two symmetric stable non-fundamental equilibria coexist with price lager and
smaller than fundamental value respectively, as proposition 3 and 4 indicate. In
a narrow range near α1 = 1 chaos appears as illustrated in figure 4 where many
points correspond to a single α1 value, and the numerical simulation results of
this chaotic parameter setting is in figure 3. All the results coincide with previous
analysis.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a multi-agent model with stochastic transition mechanism.
The dynamic of the market can be governed by a system of differential equations
in three state variables of market confidence index, rationality index and price.
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Fig. 4. Bifurcation diagram with α2 = 0.2 and α3 = 0.5
Analysis on this system shows that under different settings of parame-
ters representing traders’ propensities, market exhibits four dynamic regimes
including fundamental equilibrium, non-fundamental equilibrium, periodicity
and chaos. When strategy-switching propensity, price-chasing propensity and
mimetic propensity are all small, market is in a fundamental equilibrium; when
the stable conditions are violated, a hopf bifurcation leads to periodicity regime.
When the mimetic propensity is large enough, two symmetric non-fundamental
equilibria coexist. In a narrow range between non-fundamental equilibria and
periodicity regime, chaos appears as a transitional phenomena.
Relative to the volatile market price, traders’ propensities are much stable, so
understanding the influence of traders’ propensities to market dynamic regimes
may shed light on the complex behavior of the stock market.
The parameter calibration to make the model precise enough to describe the
dynamics of a real market is the direction of our further research.
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